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THE NEED FOR SEPARATE EVALUATION
William W Schwarzer*
Evaluation of the operation of the sentencing
guidelines is currently the focus of much study and
discussion. The Sentencing Commission recently
issued its four-year report, the General Accounting
Office is engaged in a study, and academics and
practitioners are devoting attention to the subject.
Because of the profound impact of sentencing
guidelines on the administration of criminal justice,
careful study and clear analysis are essential.
Two factors muddy such analysis. First, manda-
tory minimum sentencing statutes operate concur-
rently with the guidelines and, indeed, formed the
basis for the Commission's drug guidelines. It is
therefore not possible to disentangle the effects of
mandatory minimums from those of the sentencing
guidelines. Second, the data bases available to
researchers in the sentencing area were not designed
for this evaluation and have their limitations. Quan-
titative assessments must therefore be viewed with
caution, conclusions tempered with some skepticism,
and final judgments reserved. Nevertheless, signifi-
cant data are emerging from the research that
deserve attention and warrant consideration in
policy making.
Recent research by the Federal Judicial Center has
focused on the sentencing of drug offenders across a
seven year period during which both mandatory
minimums and sentencing guidelines began having
their effect. The primary interest was in the impact
of the mandatory minimum sentencing laws.' Re-
grettably, there were no data bases that distinguished
sentences imposed under mandatory minimum laws.
It was therefore not possible to identify, collect and
analyze cases disposed of under those laws.2 But it
was possible, using information coded from presen-
tence reports, to study drug convictions and deter-
mine which cases involved drug amounts that
warrant a sentence under the mandatory minimum
laws (whatever sentence was actually imposed).
I. THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION
A study conducted primarily by Dr. Barbara Meier-
hoefer of the Center demonstrates how certain
sentencing factors have influenced the length of
sentences imposed on drug offenders over time.
3
The influential factors for both offenders with
mandatory minimum behaviors and other drug
* Director, Federal Judicial Center. The opinions
expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the
Center or its Board.
offenders are: drug type and amount, prior record,
role in the offense, gender and race.
Putting aside drug type, drug quantity and prior
offenses, which are the operative sentencing factors
under the mandatory minimum statutes, it is curious
that the other identified factors should influence the
sentencing of offenders with mandatory minimum
behavior when the statute by its terms bars their
consideration, at least for sentencing below the
minimum.4
Were mandatory minimum laws applied auto-
matically to the statutory offense behaviors, letting
the chips fall where they may, one would expect that,
after 1986 (when the mandatory minimum drug laws
were enacted), the differences in the sentences for
mandatory minimum behaviors would differ little
based on role in the offense, gender, and race. In-
stead, since 1986, the sentences for the more culpable
drug offenders remain more than double those for
similarly situated less culpable drug offenders; males
continue to receive sentences about 40 percent higher
than those of females; and the difference between
average sentences imposed on black and white
offenders has increased (from 28 percent in 1984 to 49
percent in 1990). A racially disparate impact of man-
datory minimum sentences is further demonstrated
by the fact that, among defendants whose behavior
warranted imposition of mandatory minimum
sentences, non-white defendants received the man-
datory prison term 20 percent more often than white
defendants. Moreover, of all cases in which the
offense behavior warranted imposition of a manda-
tory minimum sentence, a sentence at or above that
level was imposed only 60 percent of the time.
The irony that emerges is that discretion intrudes
even into the most rigid sentencing scheme. If that is
true, one might well ask: why give it all to advocate
prosecutors and none to neutral judges? The pur-
pose of Congress-to send a message to drug dealers
that if you sell, e.g., 5 grams of crack, you'll go to
prison for five years-is not being accomplished.
Congressional and administration supporters of
mandatory minimum sentencing should have doubts
about the validity of their underlying assumptions in
light of this evidence of discretionary application.' It
is not that the sentencing scheme is not tough and
rigid enough, but rather that the tougher and more
rigid one seeks to make it, the more determined the
effort (and the greater the need) to evade it.
II. THE CRACK-POWDER COCAINE INEQUITY
The most disturbing data to come out of the study
are those suggesting racial disparity in the applica-
tion of mandatory minimum laws. One can only
speculate about the explanation for this phenome-
non. Presumably, racial animus is not a factor in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But it is quite
likely that mandatory minimums have a dispropor-
tionate impact on defendants charged with the sale
and distribution of crack. 6 The penalties for crack are
one hundred times as heavy as those for cocaine, e.g.,
5 grams of so-called cocaine base (crack) is treated
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the same as 500 grams of cocaine; 50 grams of crack
is treated the same as 5 kilos of cocaine; and, inciden-
tally, crack is treated 20 times more severely than
heroin. As a result, even small street-level crack
dealers become subject to severe mandatory mini-
mum sentences and are caught up in the net of
federal prosecutions. This, in turn, means not only
that crack defendants are disproportionately black,
but also that most of them will be small timers who
have little of value to offer the prosecutor to bargain
for a reduced charge or a downward departure for
substantial assistance (authorized under the statute
only on motion of the government). By way of
comparison, dealers in large quantities of cocaine are
more likely to have information about their chain of
distribution that the government would consider
worth bargaining for.
This situation results from the 1986 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act which prescribed these increased penalties
for crack. Its legislative history reveals great concern
in Congress over a national crack epidemic, stimu-
lated by the then recent deaths of Len Bias, the
basketball player, and Don Rogers, a football player.
Crack, which can be smoked, was regarded as much
more addictive than cocaine. And because crack was
effective in smaller quantities, it was thought to be
more readily available to the youth market. For these
reasons the existing drug laws were considered
inadequate to deal with the perceived dangers.
The extreme disparity between crack and cocaine
penalties, and its accompanying racially disparate
impact, have raised questions concerning a potential
violation of the equal protection clause. Federal
courts of appeals have so far rejected constitutional
attacks on the treatment for crack offenders. But in
Minnesota v. Russell, 477 NW2d 886 (1991), the Min-
nesota Supreme Court declared that state's statute,
under which possession of 3 grams of crack is pun-
ished the same as possession of 10 grams of cocaine,
to be unconstitutional as applied. The court found
that the evidence did not support the underlying
premise of the statute that possession of the required
amount signified that the person was a dealer. It also
found insufficient evidence to support a distinction
based on the relative danger and addictive quality of
crack and cocaine. Most significantly, the court found
that, of the persons charged with crack possession, 97
percent were black; of the persons charged with
cocaine possession, 80 percent were white.
III. INCENTIVES TO PLEAD GUILTY
Putting aside the problem of disparate racial impact,
the Center's study shows more generally the signifi-
cant effect of the prosecutor's power over charging
decisions and downward departures for substantial
cooperation. Notwithstanding the total absence of
judicial discretion to sentence below the minimums,
it appears that some defendants at least are able to
negotiate out of mandatory minimum sentences.
Although specific data linking sentences to the
statutes are not available, it is not disputed that
decisions about charging, bargaining, and motions
for downward departures result in below-minimum
sentences for behavior within the statutes.
A failure to gain a favorable charge or departure
decision by the prosecutor, whether as a part of a
plea bargain or otherwise, has devastating conse-
quences for a defendant subject to mandatory
minimums. To illustrate:
- simple possession of one gram of crack
carries a five year mandatory minimum if it
is a third offense;
- distribution of 10 grams of crack carries a 5
year minimum, or ten years if it is a second
drug felony conviction;
- distribution of 50 grams of crack carries a 20
year minimum if the defendant had a prior
drug felony conviction-federal, state or
foreign-and mandatory life without parole
after two prior felony convictions.
Faced with such penalties, and no possibility that
judicial sentencing discretion can intervene, defen-
dants often conclude that there is little to be lost by
going to trial, unless the egregiousness of the offense
disclosed by the evidence might lead a judge to
impose a sentence above the minimum after trial. It
is safe to say, therefore, that the risk of mandatory
minimum sentences provides a powerful impetus to
go to trial.
The incentives under the mandatory minimums
are profoundly different from those under the
sentencing guidelines. While substantially restrict-
ing judicial discretion, the guidelines nevertheless
offer some incentives to plead guilty: both the
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and that
for obstruction of justice operate to serve that end.
At the middle levels of the guideline table, the two-
level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility can
produce a spread between the high and low of the
guideline range of well over a year, and in the higher
criminal history categories of three years or more.
Moreover, the guidelines afford opportunities for
negotiation to lessen the sentence in other areas, such
as relevant conduct and role in the offense.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION
These distinctions between sentencing under
mandatory minimums and the guidelines must be
kept in mind when assessing sentencing data. In
particular, any evaluation of the impact of the
sentencing guidelines on guilty plea rates and trial
rates will require careful analysis. There is evidence
tending to show that plea rates in drug and weapons
cases are declining whereas those for other types of
offenses are increasing.7 The decline in plea rates in
drugs and weapons cases, many of which are subject
to mandatory minimums, may reflect the lack of
incentives to plead under the mandatory minimum
statutes rather than the impact of the sentencing
guidelines per se. While it is generally undisputed
that sentencing guidelines have made sentencing
more time-consuming and burdensome for district
judges-not to mention appellate judges who must
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hear appeals from sentencing decisions-it is far from
clear that the guidelines have affected the rate of
pleas and trials. Assessing the impact of the guide-
lines on plea and trial rates in drug and weapons
cases subject to mandatory minimum sentences
which the sentencing guidelines incorporate is
therefore highly problematical.
A fair evaluation of the operation of the guide-
lines will require the development and segregation of
mandatory minimum data. And it would also be
aided considerably if the Sentencing Commission
would develop guidelines for drug cases independ-
ent of the mandatory minimums. Though manda-
tory minimums would trump the guidelines in any
case in which they apply, separating guideline con-
victions from those driven by mandatory minimums
would make it possible to evaluate the operation and
impact of each system fairly and accurately.
FOOTNOTES
I Although such a time series analysis does not allow
unequivocal attribution of changes to particular circum-
stances, noticeable changes in sentencing that occurred in
1987, following enactment of mandatory minimum statutes,
but before guidelines, are taken to suggest an effect of these
laws.
2 This deficiency should be remedied in future studies.
The Sentencing Commission has been collecting data since
early 1989 on whether the charge of conviction carried a
mandatory minimum term. The Commission's Monitoring
Unit, however, considers these data of questionable
reliability based on samples they have drawn to study the
effect of minimums.
3 B. Meierhoefer, The General Effect of Mandatory Minimum
Prison Terms: A Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences Imposed
(Federal Judicial Center, in press); B. Meierhoefer, "The Role
of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentenc-
ing," paper presented at the Federal Sentencing Symposium,
University of Southern California Law Center (February,
1992).
4 The statutes do, of course, allow courts to impose
sentences above the minimum, in conformity with the
sentencing guidelines, but the minimum is generally so high
that the exercise of upward discretion is not a significant
factor in the analysis of the operation of mandatory mini-
mum statutes.
5 In addition, the efficacy of using severe sentences as
potential deterrents for groups of offenders who do not
believe they will be caught has always been questionable.
I The supposition cannot be tested directly because the
available data bases do not differentiate between crack and
powder cocaine. The Sentencing Commission is now in the
process of implementing a data module that will include this
distinction.
I T. Dunworth and C. Weisselberg, "Felony Cases and the
Federal Courts: The Guidelines Experience," paper presented
at the Federal Sentencing Symposium, University of Southern
California Law Center (February, 1992).
